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1. Public Administration Reforms in the                      
EEU – Introduction
Michiel S. de Vries
Political institutions can change overnight. Illustrative is the fall of the 
Berlin wall in November 1989, by which the people from then called Eastern 
germany were offered the exit option to escape from the communist regime. 
within a couple of years, the political regime in the whole region of Central 
Europe changed from belonging to the Communist bloc towards moving to 
the western bloc in which democracy and the free market ideology became 
dominant. 
However, the governmental, administrative and societal institutions that 
until then influenced the norms, beliefs and actions of individuals and or-
ganizations still had to be reformed and this process continues until today. 
This includes creation of new governance models, organization of the public 
administration, reform of administrative procedures, development of a civil 
service, process of decentralization and agencification. The process pointed 
to several interesting issues, for instance, that what is normally seen as most 
difficult, changing the constitution proved to be the easiest part of the whole 
reform process. One would have expected that other reforms would evolve as 
smoothly because a huge amount of money was released by the affluent world 
(IMF, world Bank, EU etc.) to provide international technical assistance in 
order to make the reforms work, and the new western partners offered an in-
teresting incentive that if the reforms would work out and go in the direction 
desired by these countries and international organizations, the Central Eu-
ropean countries could become member of the European Union, which was 
judged at the time to be very profitable. The EU also provided a strategic 
goal for the needed reforms, the model of the European Administrative Space 
(EAS). The idea of EAS was launched when the Central European countries 
applied for EU membership in the 1990s. One of the criteria for the potential 
Member States  was that they should have sufficient national administrative 
capacities to comply with the acquis (Trondal & Peters, 2013: 303, see also 
Trondal, J., & Jeppesen, L., 2006).
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It was in the 1980s and 1990s that institutional standards to promote 
this idea emerged. Scholars point to the advisory role of EIPA and SIgMA. 
Others see the catalytic effect of the actual emergence of local twinning pro-
jects, cross-border regions, and the emergence of the Schengen area, the area 
without borders within the European Union, on the need for effective enfor-
cement of the Union Law through the EAS (Beck, 2015). Still others point to 
the decisive impact of the Copenhagen Criteria of 1993, defining whether a 
country is eligible to join the European Union; the Madrid Treaty, introdu-
cing the need for adjustment of administrative and judicial structures so as 
to be able to transpose the EU Law and effectively implement it; the Luxem-
bourg Treaty of 1997, pointing to the need for strengthening institutions; and 
the Helsinki Treaty of 1999, with the explicit obligation of candidate coun-
tries to share the values and objectives of the European Union as set out in the 
treaties (Torma, 2011). The standard-setting organization at that moment, 
SIgMA, rightly pointed out in 1998: “[I]t is clear that the EAS is now begin-
ning to emerge” (SIgMA 1998: 15). 
At the time, the “future” accession provided an incentive for a huge 
number of reforms in the CEE-countries. The expanding acquis, with its 
requirements limiting institutional discretion and thus having a profound 
impact on national administrative styles and structures, made sure that not 
only the CEE countries, but also the existing Member States were affected 
(knill, 2001: 214). This influence varied over different policies, dependent on 
the basic pattern by which the European policies exerted influence on natio-
nal administrative styles and structures, and according to the extent to which 
such needed compliance was in line with national administrations’ beliefs 
and preferences (knill, 2001: 227). However, overall, an Europeanization of 
national administrations was said to have taken place, making Matei and Ma-
tei conclude in 2008: It “appears as the closure for a large process that implies 
convergence, Europeanization and administrative dynamics” (2008: 46).
Also theoretically one would expect a smooth and rapidly progressing 
process, as institutions are seen as endogenous, that is, that “their form and 
their functioning depend on the conditions under which they emerge and 
endure” (Douglas North, 1980, 1990, Przeworski, 2004: 527). Since the con-
ditions had changed dramatically in Central Europe, there was a necessity 
that administrative and societal institutions would adapt to the new situation 
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swiftly. 
From a rationalist and functionalist perspective, availability of a strategic 
goal – the model of the EAS and the necessity to reform – needed adaptation 
to the new conditions,  desirability to reform – the incentive to become the 
EU members, opportunities created through the availability of resources and 
technical assistance to make the reform happen international resources relea-
sed to make it feasible, and technical assistance offered, all result in the same 
expectation, namely that the institutional structure existing in all Central Eu-
ropean countries in all its dimensions would quickly change and converge to 
the western model. 
However, this rationalist and functionalist approach neglects the limita-
tions and inhibitors to such institutional reforms. The best-known inhibitor 
is posed by the so-called path-dependences. “Institutions are the rules of the 
game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that 
shape human interaction” (North, 1990: 3) and often have a life of their own 
in that it is difficult, if not impossible, to initiate radical changes in the ins-
titution or to eliminate it. As Mahoney (2000: 507) argued, “path dependen-
ce characterizes specifically those historical sequences in which contingent 
events set into motion institutional patterns or event chains that have deter-
ministic properties“. when more and complementary institutions are set up, 
as is usual in societies, it becomes costly to radically change them or to aban-
don them because changing one institution can have serious implications for 
other institutions. Often, there are “configurations of complementary institu-
tions in which the performance of each is affected by the existence of others” 
(cf. de Vries, 2016: 47; Pierson, 2000: 78). Being subject to a communist regi-
me for 45 years had created a system of such complementary institutions in 
Central Europe and a legacy that would be easily overcomed by the reforms. 
In Central Europe, such path dependences were strengthened by factors at 
the macro-, meso- and micro-level. At the micro-level the legacy remained 
visible because individual public administrators who were already in function 
in the previous regime with all their norms, beliefs and values and inclina-
tions to act in ways acquired in the previous regime, were given the opportu-
nity to stay in function under the new regime, resulting in the conservation 
of those norms, values and beliefs within the administrative apparatus. At 
the meso-level, path dependencies are seen in the legalistic traditions being 
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still dominant in many Central European countries. One of the reasons for 
this is that, although the EAS requested more efficiency, it also promoted the 
conservation of that already existing legalism through the bureaucratic pro-
cedures it imposed by requiring the Central European countries to adopt the 
acquis communautaire of the EU.
At the macro-level, institutional arrangements at the national level, are not 
just decided upon and changed because of the emergence of a new regime and 
on rationalist and functionalist reasoning, but remain subjected to the basics of 
politics, that is, power and interests. People in power, irrespective of the regi-
me-type, will always be hesitant to renounce that power and will be irrespecti-
ve of the regime-type have a keen eye after their own interests. This conforms 
to the theory of Hall and Taylor (1996: 938) and Steinmo (1992) who explain 
institutional resilience by the actions of the coalitions in power, trying to pre-
serve their prerogatives and avoid reforms that would diminish their power or 
would counter their interests. This predominance of power and interests is seen 
in processes of decentralization; processes to change the position of national 
banks, for instance, processes to increase transparency, etc. (cf. de Vries, 2000).
The above results question what has really happened to the administra-
tive institutions in Central Europe during its transformation and how public 
administrative reforms are perceived, conceptualized and implemented, and 
if this could resulted in additions to the currently dominant theories about pu-
blic administration reform. It is not a question that can be answered through 
a general, rather abstract overview of the developments, but needs in-depth 
analyses pointing out the communalities and differences in the approaches in 
different countries. That is the topic of this book and is being investigated for 
the Central European countries. 
Vainius Smalskys, Andrius Stasiukynas, Jurgita Domeikienė, Mantas Bi-
leišis investigate the reforms in Lithuania and point out that such reforms in 
Lithuania were challenging for the governments trying, on the one hand, to 
be the darling of the EU in complying swiftly to its requirements, but on the 
other hand losing sight of the interests of its citizens, and hardly reforming its 
administration in so far as it is not required by the EU.
Maris Pukis, Inesa Voroncuka and Olga Starineca argue for Latvia that 
the reforms were accompanied by huge conflicts between the stakeholders, 
and again that as far as the EU legislation was concerned the reforms went 
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rather smoothly, but regarding the domestic reforms, conflicts of interest and 
political considerations were dominant. This resulted in reforms that at times 
went back and forth, dependent on the distribution of power and the discre-
tion allowed to the public administration. 
Mariusz w. Sienkiewicz and Stanisław Michałowski investigate the re-
forms that have occurred in Poland, and note that all these reforms failed to 
meet the citizens’ interests, and that the achievement of all objectives of the 
reforms can be disputed.
Juraj Nemec, Beata Mikusova Merickova, Maria Murray Svidronova, 
and Peter Pisar set forth the reforms in Slovakia, andalthough certain reforms 
were effective, the overall system is still overpoliticized and the reforms un-
controlled, not modeled according to a rational design, and having hardly any 
benefits for the population.
györgy gajduschek, Tamás M. Horváth and károly Jugovits argue for 
Hungary by stating that the reforms lacked a coherent strategic vision and 
political support, and emerged out of contradictory reform models as Poland 
went back and forth dependent on the dominant political coalition in power. 
Polonca kovač and Primož Pevcin argue for Slovenia by stating that 
although there are radical changes of previous governance approaches visible 
due to internal incentives and the Europeanization process there always have 
been and still are implementation gaps, and that it all depends on political 
consensus rather than technical and operational measures to improve on this. 
For Croatia, that although in the light of the EU membership many re-
forms were intitiated, as analyzed by Ivan koprić, the size of its public sector, 
history, administrative tradition, and other administrative particularities in 
combination with the existence of a number of influential trade unions who 
follow the internal bureaucratic resistance to reforms, inhibited in-depth pu-
blic administration reforms. 
Călin Emilian Hințea and Tudor Cristian Țiclău highlight the reforms 
in Romania, and observe that despite, or perhaps due to all the reforms that 
have been initiated during the last 25 years and are still ongoing in the field 
of legislation, intergovernmental relations, human resource management and 
financial management, the predictability and coherence of the civil service is 
still severely lacking, the managerial performance has not improved, that one 
cannot yet speak of a rational use of public resources, and finally, that the popu-
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lation did not profit from the reforms.
Tatyana Tomova and Simeon Petrov present the reforms in Bulgaria that 
were hardly following a coherent strategic plan. Instead, they point out that 
Bulgaria witnesses a strong fragmentation in the field of strategic planning 
and a huge number of strategic documents. what strategy to follow seems 
to depend on the international and supranational commitments of the State, 
which are a result of financial dependence (International Monetary Fund), 
donor programs (world Bank, EU), or the voluntary inclusion in general po-
litical and normative space (EU).
All this implies there was no common conceptual model underlying the 
reforms that took place in Central Europe. Reforms were initiated only if they 
were really needed based on external pressure, but not out of a coherent re-
form model, such as New Public Management, New Public governance, Va-
lue Based governance, New Public Administration, and the like. Certainly, 
such models were referred to with the purpose to give the intended reforms 
some credibility and legitimacy, but they did not present the basis out of 
which one could understand the outcomes of the reforms. 
From the perspective of public administration as a discipline, the findings 
that reforms in Central Europe were not based thereon and also were hardly 
done on behalf of the interests of the population, but rather on the interests of 
administrators and politicians, is on the one hand weird, but at the same time 
very interesting. It makes one inquisitive in the answer to the question whether 
there is any convergence to the western model, whether all the reforms are 
just temporary instead of structural and whether the return to the central state 
model as is happening in Hungary could also be possible in other Central Eu-
ropean countries if the EU fails to deliver on its promises. As all the authors in 
this book argue, most of the reforms in Central Europe were were conducted 
seemingly reluctantly. The consequence is that all these reforms are far from 
stable and structural and can easily be reversed if their payoff fails to materia-
lize (cf. Sobis & De Vries, 2014). This is already seen in some way in Hungary 
and Poland, but could also become reality in other Central European states.   
This makes the investigation of institutional change and its driving forces 
not only interesting from a scholarly perspective, but also from the perspecti-
ve of a concerned citizen, who was pleased to see the EU expand, but has to 
reconsider the dangers thereof possibly emerging in the near future.
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